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Preoccupied with political challenges in
Europe and the Middle East and with economic
competition from I apan, most Americans are
ignoring a powerful longer-term trend in
Southeast Asia: the rise of the greater China
economy. Paced by a rapid rate of investment
and given the abundance of trained human capital, the Asian rim has become the fastest
growing part of the world, averaging over five
percent a year in ~eal eeonomic growth. That
trend is generally expected to continue at least
for the rest of this decade and perhaps well into
the twenty-first century .1
Without underestimating the strategic role of
the I apanese economy in the Asian rim, there is
another way of looking at economic developments in this key region. Over the years,
scholars in the United States have referred to
the Chinas as a multiple - two Chinas, three
Chinas, and more. They have in mind the fact
that several of the major economies of this region have a predominantly Chinese population
and an unusual degree of interaction is evident:
In addition to mainland China, the overall
Chinese economy includes such other rapidly
growing areas as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao,
and Singapore. This category also includes
other key locations where business executives,
traders, and financiers of Chinese background
make important economic contributions. According to some estimates, Chinese companies
Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished
University Professor and Director of the Center for
the Study of American Business at Washington
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in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines make up about 70 percent of the private
sector in those countries. 2
The "Chinese-based economy" has resisted
the global recession which in recent years has
plagued virtually every advanced industrial nation. This informal economy is currently the
world leader in terms of economic growth, industrial expansion, and exports. It contains an
array of potential consumers that far exceeds
the markets in Europe or the Western Hemisphere.
Within the Asian rim, this dynamic pattern
contrasts with the recent slowdown in the pace
of Japanese economic and financial activity.
Japan Is foreign direct investment flows reached
a peak of $67 billion in 1989 and have been declining since. The 1991 total came to a modest
$41 billion, lower than the 1988 rate. Japanese
direct investment in Asia declined simultaneously, from a peak of a little over $8 billion in
1989 to less than $6 billion in 1991.
Moreover, Japanese banks have tended to reduce their participation in the international
banking market. The $53 billion reduction in
their foreign banking assets in the second
quarter of 1992 was the largest recorded to
date. 3 Of course, in absolute terms, Japan
continues to be the dominant economy in Asia
and will continue to hold that position for many
years.

The Nature of the Chinese-Based
Economy
Despite the current Japanese dominance of
the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia
is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce, and finance. This strategic
area contains substantial amounts of technology
and ~anufacturing capability (Taiwan), outs~dtng entrepreneurial, marketing, and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network (Singapore), a tremendous pool
of fmancial capital (all three), and very large
2

endowments of land, resources, and labor
(mainland China). A talking doll, to take a
modest example, may be designed in Hong
Kong, contain a computer chip made in Taiwan, and be assembled in China.

Transnational networks are the backbone
of the East Asian economy.
The informal Chinese economy differs from
the more official economies which usually are
dominated by large multinational firms. Of the
world 1s 500 leading industrial companies in the
world in 1991, only one, Chinese Petroleum,
was part of the greater China economy (it is
Taiwanese, and is in 166th place). In comparison, 13 Korean companies make the list; the
largest, Samsung, is the 18th largest industrial
firm listed in the Fortune tabulation.
The Chinese-based economy consists in
large measure of midsize family-run firms,
rather than the huge corporations characteristic
of Japan, Western Europe, and the United
States. Transnational networks seem to be the
natural accompaniment of the Chinese trading
tradition. These channels for the movement of
information, finance, goods, and capital help to
explain the relative flexibility and efficiency of
the numerous ongoing informal agreements and
transactions that bind together the various parts
of the Chinese-based trading area.
From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala
Lumpur to Manila, this influential network often based on extensions of the traditional
clans - has been described as the backbone of
the East Asian economy. A substantial amount
of cross-investment and trade takes place, often
on a family basis. Frequently, these business
ties involve "overseas" Chinese who are dealing with people in the province of China from
which they or their ancestors migrated
(tongbao or compatriots).4
To be sure, government is often heavily involved in the ownership if not the operation of
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many specific ~nterprises. In Taiwan, the
KMT (the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang) is
the largest property owner, with widespread
business interests. In mainland China, in addition to numerous private ventures (often in
collaboration with foreign investors), government owns a great variety of enterprises.
These range from the central government's giant steel mills to local government factories.
The trading companies, which engage in a variety of commercial, banking, and manufacturing
activities, are owned by governmental units,
ranging from the army to a local county. s

1hree-.fifths of all foreign investment
in China has been made by Hong Kong's
Chinese entrepreneurs.
The close connection between public and
private sectors and the greater China economy
is illustrated by the operations of the Shanghai
Far East Container Company. This joint venture between Shanghai, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan involves enterprises in all three areas to
produce steel containers in Shanghai. An even
greater extension of capitalism occurred in June
1992, when the city of Wuhan allowed
Hongtex Development Company, a Hong Kong
firm, to buy a 51 percent share of Wuhan No.
2 Printing and Dyeing Company. This transaction marked the first time a "foreign" company
was allowed to acquire a majority stake in a
state-owned enterprise in China, albeit an ailing
one.
.
In contrast, the city of Qiaotori, in Zhejiang
province, has no state-owned enterprises. This
metropolitan area has recently become the button-making capital of China. Seven Hong
Kong and Taiwan companies have set up joint
ventures to produce buttons for China's growing textile industry. 6

4

The Close Connections
Several economic indicators, ranging from
modest to basic, illustrate the close connection
among the "Chinas." Eight years ago, the. special economic zone of Xiamen in mainland
China booked 10 telephone calls a month to
Taiwan. Currently, such calls are averaging
60,000 a month and the number continues to
rise. In 1987, fewer than 7,000 Taiwanese
visited the mainland. The current rate is approximately 1 million a year. Bilateral trade,
which can legally be conducted only through
third countries, was about $1.5 billion in 1987.
The current figure is about $6 billion, a fourfold increase. In addition, about 4,000 Taiwan
enterprises have set up factories in China,
mainly in the south. In the aggregate, more
than 5,000 Taiwanese companies have invested
approximately $5 billion in the China mainland.?
The current state of interdependence between mainland China and Hong Kong is even
more striking. Each is the other's largest
trading partner and largest source of external
investment. Three-fifths of all foreign investment in China has been made by Hong Kong's
Chinese entrepreneurs. 8
A recent example of this development is the
$60 million project on the part of Hong Kongbased Tian An China Group to construct a
large commercial and office building in the
heart of Changzhou, an industrial city in
Jiangsu province. Similar is the teaming up of
Hong · Kong's Kwah International Holdings
with a variety of partners in China to develop a
commercial office tower in Shanghai. The
partners include the Hwang Pu District
Resettlement unit, the People's Bank of China,
the Shanghai Land Development Company, and
the Hwang Pu district government. 9
The People's Republic of China has reportedly invested approximately $11 billion in
Hong Kong trade, real estate, transport, and financial enterprises. One result is that the Bank
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of China is now the second biggest bank in the
colony, as measured by volume of deposits. In
the other direction, 80 percent of Hong Kong's
manufacturing companies have branches in
China, employing more than three million
workers. Apparently there were far more people working in China for businesses owned by
Hong Kong or on orders received from them
than the entire manufacturing work force of
Hong Kong itself (in a reported ratio of 4 to
1).10

Approximately 50,000 managers and professionals commute daily from Hong Kong to the
nearby Guangdong province. About 60 percent
of China's exports go through Hong Kong.
These reexports, in turn, account for the
greater part of Hong Kong's exports. The data
support the conclusion of William Purves,
chairman of the Hong Kong Bank Group, that
"Investment and expertise channeled from
Hong Kong have turned southern China into
one of the industrial powerhouses of Asia." 11
In fact, what some observers call the greater
"Hong Kong enclave" is likely soon to enjoy a
gross domestic product as large as that of
France.
Macao, a neighbor of Hong Kong, is also
undergoing a period of rapid growth. Although under nominal Portuguese sovereignty
until 1999, this island economy is developing
its ties with the rest of the greater China
.economy. The new airport being built on the
island has the strong support of mainland China
(which differs from the case of the controversial new airport being planned for Hong
Kong). China's Chung Luen consortium holds
an 8.67 percent interest in the company which
is building and is also scheduled to operate the
facility .12
At the more macroeconomic level, some
private analysts, adding up the foreign exchange reserves of the various Chinas, come to
a present total of $200 billion. That amount is
far in excess of the foreign exchange holdings
of any other economic power worldwide. It
surely is an impressive financial aggregation
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with considerable potential for influencing the
direction of future economic developments.
Indeed, in 1991 Taiwan alone was the
largest single foreign investor in Malaysia and
also in Vietnam. Cumulative foreign direct investment from the newly industrialized economies of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore is
beginning to surpass that of both Japan and the
United States in Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand. Not too surprising, the rapidly developing Asian rim countries are turning to
new suppliers within their own region for their
imports. These newly developing countries
now buy 33 percent of their imports from other
nations within the region compared to less than
24 percent as recently as 1985.13
1he economy of mainland China may exceed
that of Japan by the year 2000,
if not sooner.

The trend toward the internationalization of
production within the greater Chinese area is
not generally viewed, however, as motivated
by the desire to integrate trade. Rather, the
end objective often is to export final products
to third countries in Western Europe and North
America. Thus, trade data for Southeast Asia
must be interpreted with this tendency in mind .

A Look to the Future
Former World Bank president Robert
McNamara has provided an upbeat long-term
appraisal of the economic prospects of mainland China. He states that, if China achieves
its economic goals for the year 2000 and then
moves forward at satisfactory but not spectacular growth rates, that nation's per capita income in 2050 may be roughly equal to that of
the United Kingdom in 1965. The total size of
its economy would approximate that of the
United States or Western Europe.14 One U.S.
7

economist estimates that the economy of mainland China alone may exceed that of I apan by
the year 2000, if not sooner.lS
When we add to these forecasts the other
parts of the greater China economy, the economic implications of the extension of current
trends into the twenty-first century becomes
awe-inspiring. This study leaves the subject of
potential political unification to others. We
must take note, of course, of the severe strains
in mainland China which are arising as an economically backward, communist-led nation attempts to move to a capitalist regime. Almost
by definition, adoption of a private enterprise
system, however halting and incomplete, means
the broadening of the society's power base and
considerable decentralization of decisionmaking. The existing power structure is not likely
to respond to these changes passively.
Moreover, recent purchases of advanced
military aircraft by Taiwan have raised levels
of tension in the area. However, this study
focuses on the economic aspects of the developments of the Greater China economy. The implicit assumption here is that the pervasive attractions of rapid economic development will,
at least in the long run, overcome political
animosities. The tragic events in Lebanon,
however, show the limitations of this assumption. In that case, the great economic potential
of the country was virtually destroyed by unreconcilable political antagonism.
Surely the more complete industrialization
of Southeast Asia is a prospect that Western
analysts have not fully examined. Nevertheless, a few already are referring to a
forthcoming Chinese Century. The Chinese
Productivity Triangle is another, and more
modest, description that is in use. With the
opening of China and capital flows to it,
Greater China is rapidly becoming one of the
world's most vibrant economies. It is no exaggeration to state that Greater China is a potential economic superpower.
A historical parallel comes to mind: the key
role in international commerce of the Hanseatic
11
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League. For many centuries during the late
middle ages, the League tied together first the
merchants and then many of the cities of northem Germany and the Baltic area. Historians
stress the fact that the Hanse cities did not set
up a joint or unified government. Rather, the
business and government leaders cooperated on
matters of mutual economic and financial interest. A shifting array of participants can be
identified over the centuries. Some of the large
German cities in the qualifying area did not
participate at all, and many entered into the cooperative arrangements for only limited periods
oftime. 16
.

Greater China is rapidly becoming one of
the world's most vibrant economies.
Unlike the European Community or the
North American Free Trade Agreement, the
Hanseatic League was not a compact among
sovereign powers, nor did it constitute a supergovernment. Individual members continued to
owe their traditional allegiance to the specific
political power that controlled the part of the
region in which they resided. Technically, the
League was an amorphous organization, lacking legal status and possessing neither finances
of its own nor an independent army or navy.
Nevertheless, the Hanse merchants cooperated in many important ways, providing mutual
support in times of danger. They constituted
an identifiable economic grouping which competed with businesses in Holland, Italy, and on
different occasions, many of the nations facing
the Baltic Sea. Despite the obvious limitations
of a nongovernmental organization spread over
considerable distances - Bergen in Norway
was an important Hanse location as was
Novgorod in Russia - for almost five centuries the Hanseatic League was an economic
power to be reckoned with.
No analyst can forecast with any degree of
assurance the future nature of economic rela9

tionships in Eastern Asia. Will a modem version of the Hanseatic League be created? Will
a counterpart to the European Community
arise? Will the more modest arrangements being developed in North America be the precedent that will be followed? Or will the present
informal relationships be relied· on in view of
their substantial success?
Whatever the answer, trends rarely move in
a straight line for an extended period of time.
In the· recent past, setbacks have occurred in
the economic and political development of
Southeast Asia and future detours are likely.
Some experts offer a more pessimistic assessment than presented in this report. Ross Terrill
of the East Asian Research Center of Harvard
University believes that China can never truly
prosper while the Communist Party retains its
monopoly of power. Any gains resulting from
piecemeal economic reforms, in this view, will
merely benefit the· Communists by pacifying the
citizenry. Other visitors to China report that
their dominant impression of the new economic
wnes, such as Guangdong, is one of official
favoritism, inside deals, and outright bribery.
As economic journalist Dan Cordtz recently
wrote after an extensive visit, China remains a
poor, developing nation by Western standards:
"At best, it is a bicycle society moving up to
motor scooters." 17
Great uncertainty surely attaches to the future of the Chinese economy. The People's
Republic is making it clear that it wants to participate actively in determining the future direction of the economy of Hong Kong. But
there is little clarity as to the nature of that
participation and the desired direction of
change. Likewise, the relations between Peking and Taipei at best can be described as
ambiguous. The political ties between China
and th~ rest of the Chinese trading area, notably Stngapore, range from loose to nonexistent. The notion of political integration does
not now appear as a realistic short-term
prospect. However, what does seem likely is

.tO

~ntinuing

informal integration, perhaps leadmg to a de facto Chinese Common Market.
Nevertheless, forces of economic and business development seem likely to dominate especially~ the_long run. As in Eastern Eu;ope,
commumsm did not fall primarily because the
people rejected the ideology of Marx (if they
ever understood it). Rather, they saw the
v~tly greater. benefi~ of democracy and
pnvate enterpnse. Whichever specific course
is followed in Southeast Asia, it is reasonable
to expect some type of response to the
economic unification that is now occurring in
the two other major competitive areas, Western
Europe and North America.

In Eastern Europe, communism did not
fall because the people rejected
the ideology of Marx.

Conclusion
~e ris~ of the greater China economy must
be viewed m the context of the increasing globalization of economic enterprise. Despite the
many efforts of government. to restrain or at
least redirect trade and investment, individual
businesses are succeeding in overcoming these
obstacles to private decisionmaking. The mobili~ of ente~rises- of their people, capital,
and information - is reducing the power of
government. Public sector decisionmakers increasingly are being forced to understand that
ther. no~ have to become internationally competitive m the economic policies they devise.
In th~s era of computers, telephones, and fax
machmes, enterprises are extremely mobile.18
The most striking examples of that mobility are
the recent experiences of Chinese entrepreneurs.
_Even in the face of official hostility, many
Taiwanese firms and a great number of
Taiwanese individuals are succeeding in estab-

11

lishing their business presence in China. As
we have seen in the case of Hong Kong and the
mainland, the mutual economic interpenetration
is even more striking. The formal power of
government is not to be discounted - and its
destructive ability has been vividly demonstrated in innumerable wars. Nevertheless, the
continuing desire of people to respond to the
power of economic incentives and technological
advance surely seems pervasive.
Looking ahead to the twenty-first century,
the Chinese economic and trading area might
well reach across the Pacific (some early manifestations are already evident in the Silicon
Valley in California). Such a development
would form a major part of the economic and
Pacific equivalent of NATO, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. But,· unlike NATO and
like the Hanseatic League of old, that area
would not be dominated by a single government unit or depend on a military or political
pact. On the contrary, it would be both contributor to and beneficiary of the world's
largest and most open commercial region.
Barring a major political setback in the intervening period, the Chinese economic area has
the potential of providing a principal engine of
world growth in the early twenty-first century.
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